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executive summary
This publication, Implementation and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization 
Technologies, discusses specific developments in trailer tracking systems and vehicle 
immobilization systems relevant to the theft of hazardous cargoes for possible terrorism 
uses. It is based on research conducted through July of 2007, with the help of many who 
are cited in the positions they were in as of that date. It provides an overview as of that date 
of past, current, and anticipated government plans for vehicle tracking and immobilization, 
and related issues posed for state and private implementers.
This report is a sister publication to MTI Report 09-03, Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-
Borne Hazardous Materials. That publication was created in response to the Department 
of Homeland Security’s request that the Mineta Transportation Institute’s National 
Transportation Security Center of Excellence (MTI NTSCOE) provide research and 
insights regarding the security risks created by the highway transportation of hazardous 
materials. 
Since the mid-1980s, limited use has been made of vehicle tracking using satellite 
communications to mitigate the security and safety risks created by the highway 
transportation of certain types of hazardous materials. However, vehicle-tracking technology 
applied to safety and security is increasingly being researched and piloted, and it has been 
the subject of several government reports and legislative mandates.
There has been governmental implementation. The military services have long transported 
arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) by air, sea, rail, and highway. The Department 
of Defense (DOD) Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTTS) which has been in 
operation for about two decades is the longest-running government system of commercial 
vehicle tracking for safety or security reasons. It was, at the time of this research, the only 
implementation required by the government for a specific motor carrier fleet and therefore 
may yield important lessons. DTTS and the rest of the security measures required 
represented a kind of “gold standard”—an expensive one, at that—as a point of reference 
for any authority in considering transportation of high-risk hazardous materials
At the same time, the motor carrier industry has been investing in and implementing vehicle 
tracking, for a number of reasons, particularly the increase in efficiency achieved through 
better management of both personnel (drivers) and assets (trucks or, as they are known, 
tractors;  cargo loads; and trailers). Another reason for tracking is the need to reduce theft, 
particularly of high-value cargo. Finally, vehicle tracking holds the promise of reducing risks 
created by unsafe driving practices and by terrorist attacks. Insurance companies that are 
looking at available methods and technologies as well as commercial best practices no 
doubt will increasingly factor vehicle tracking into their appraisal of each company’s overall 
posture, which will in turn influence insurance rates.
Vehicle-tracking vendors are also offering more services and appear to be increasing in 
number, strength, and sophistication. At the time of this research, QUALCOMM, for example, 
was the service provider for DTTS for many years. It and other companies participated in the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 2003–2004 Field Operational Test, 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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and seven vendors are involved in a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) vehicle-
tracking pilot project. Two of the companies had also teamed up with other vendors to test 
technologies that can immobilize vehicles. A scan of advertised services conducted in July 
of 2007 suggested that these technologies offer an increasingly robust set of efficiency, 
safety, and security benefits.
While vehicle tracking and immobilization technologies can play a significant role in 
preventing truck-borne hazardous materials from being used as weapons against any 
target they are not a “silver bullet.”  Immobilization, for example, if not used in conjunction 
with clearly tested procedures, could create safety risks. 
However, the experience of DTTS and the FMCSA and TSA pilot projects indicates that 
when these technologies are combined with other security measures, and when the 
information they provide is used in conjunction with information supplied outside of the 
tracking system, they can provide defensive value to any effort to protect assets from 
attacks using highway-borne hazmat as a weapon.
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implementation and development of
vehicle tracking and immobilization 
technologies
background
Since the mid-1980s, limited use has been made of vehicle tracking using satellite 
communications to mitigate the security and safety risks created by the highway 
transportation of certain types of hazardous materials. However, vehicle-tracking technology 
applied to safety and security is increasingly being researched and piloted, and it has been 
the subject of several government reports and legislative mandates.
At the same time, the motor carrier industry has been investing in and implementing vehicle 
tracking, for a number of reasons, particularly the increase in efficiency achieved through 
better management of both personnel (drivers) and assets (trucks or, as they are known, 
tractors;  cargo loads; and trailers). Another reason for tracking is the need to reduce theft, 
particularly of high-value cargo. Finally, vehicle tracking holds the promise of reducing risks 
created by unsafe driving practices and by terrorist attacks. Insurance companies that are 
looking at available methods and technologies as well as commercial best practices no 
doubt will increasingly factor vehicle tracking into their appraisal of each company’s overall 
posture, which will in turn influence insurance rates.
Vehicle-tracking vendors are also offering more services and appear to be increasing in 
number, strength, and sophistication. QUALCOMM, for example, has been the service 
provider for the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Transportation Tracking System 
(DTTS) for many years. It and other companies participated in the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA) 2003–2004 Field Operational Test, and seven vendors are 
involved in an ongoing Transportation Security Administration (TSA) vehicle-tracking pilot 
project. Two of the companies have also teamed up with other vendors to test technologies 
that can immobilize vehicles. A scan of advertised services suggests that these technologies 
offer an increasingly robust set of efficiency, safety, and security benefits.
While vehicle tracking and immobilization technologies can play a significant role in 
preventing truck-borne hazardous materials from being used as weapons against any 
target, they are not a “silver bullet.” Immobilization, for example, if not used in conjunction 
with clearly tested procedures, could create safety risks. However, the experience of 
DTTS and the FMCSA and TSA pilot projects indicates that when these technologies are 
combined with other security measures, and when the information they provide is used 
in conjunction with information supplied outside of the tracking system, they can provide 
defensive value to any effort to protect assets from attacks using highway-borne hazmat 
as a weapon.
This report provides an overview of past, current, and anticipated government plans 
for vehicle tracking and immobilization, and related issues posed for state and private 
implementors. 
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the dod and dtts  
The military services have long transported arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E)2 
by air, sea, rail, and highway. DTTS, which has been in operation for nearly two decades, 
is the longest-running government system of commercial vehicle tracking for safety or 
security reasons. It is also the only implementation required by the government for a 
specific motor carrier fleet and therefore may yield important lessons. DTTS and the rest 
of the security measures required represent a kind of “gold standard”—an expensive one, 
at that—as a point of reference for any authority  in considering transportation of high-risk 
hazardous materials.
 
Outline of the DTS Program
Name: Defense Transportation Tracking System (DDTS)
Origin: 1984 and 1985 accidents (torpedoes and 500-pound bombs)
Cargo: Mandatory for arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) for DOD (small arms to 
Stingers to highly classified material)
Scope:
Operating for two decades• 
51 carriers; 2,876 trucks, approximately 60,000 shipments per year• 
16 main carriers that have the bulk of the business, with roughly 1,600 trucks• 
Command center in Norfolk, VA• 
Works together with high security measures:
To counter insiders: SECRET clearances for many• 
To counter access to terminal: CCTV, cages, locks and seals, signatures required at all • 
transfer points
For higher-threat shipments or all shipments under high threat:
Security escort vehicles• 
Two SECRET cleared drivers• 
Category I and II shipments held only in DOD-approved facilities• 
Shipment-specific approval• 
AA&E materials are grouped into the following four risk categories, described in DOD 
transportation regulations:3  
category i arms:•	   missiles and rockets such as Stinger and Redeye, and ammunition 
and explosives for them.
category ii arms:•	   light automatic weapons up to .50 caliber and 40-mm Mk-
19 machine guns, along with silencers, mufflers, and noise-suppression 
devices; ammunition and explosives, including grenades, high explosives, 
antitank and personnel mines, C4, and dynamite and TNT used in demolition; 
warheads for sensitive missiles; and rockets weighing less than 40 pounds each.
category iii arms:•	  launch tubes and other equipment for surface-to-air missiles 
such as Stinger and Redeye; ammunition and explosives, including grenade 
launchers, flame throwers, and certain sights.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute Nat ional  Transportat ion Secur i ty Center of  Excel lence
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Category IV arms:  shoulder-fired weapons, handguns, and recoilless rifles; •	
ammunition and explosives, including grenades, fuses, and incendiary destroyers; 
warheads for precision-guided munitions weighing more than 50 pounds.
As of October 1, 2007, 2,876 trucks operated by 51 carriers were registered in DTTS, 
but about 16 carriers, those with the bulk of the trucks, participate in everyday business. 
Cost estimates for next year’s fleet assume a fleet of 1,591 trucks, which presumably 
represent the core fleet.4 In FY07 there were 65,813 shipments (the average assumed for 
next year is 60,000). Of these, 569 were Category I shipments (0.9% of the total); 10,226 
(15.8%) were Category II shipments; 8,634 (13.3%) were Category III shipments; and 
24,327 (37.5%) were Category IV shipments. The remaining 32.5% consisted of 21,057 
“other” shipments.5  
Needless to say, a small number of specialized motor carriers participate in the program. 
The number of gasoline tankers operating, by contrast, should be far greater. According 
to MTI’s own research, the Chevron terminal in San José alone serves 400 petroleum 
tankers a day.
DTTS and the broader set of strengthened security measures run by the Surface Deployment 
and Distribution Command (SDDC)—formerly the Military Traffic Management Command 
(MTMC)—were created as the result of external events. On August 1, 1984, a tractor-semi-
trailer carrying torpedoes overturned on a major highway near Denver, Colorado, causing 
major disruption exacerbated by an emergency response from local authorities who lacked 
sufficient knowledge of the truck’s load.6  Then, on August 4, 1985, another tractor-semi-
trailer loaded with ten Mk-84 2,000-pound, general-purpose bombs collided with a car on 
I-40 near Checotah, Oklahoma. Although the accident did not result in any fatalities, the 
NTSB description of it is breathtaking:
The automobile fuel tank ruptured and spilled gasoline which quickly ignited. Both 
vehicles were engulfed in flames. Subsequent explosions from the bombs destroyed 
the vehicles and left a crater 27 feet deep and 35 feet wide in the roadway. Three 
hundred and seventy-one residences were damaged. Other buildings, including a 
school located 734 feet from the accident site, suffered substantial damage. Total 
damages were estimated at $5 million. Forty-nine persons reported to a hospital 
emergency room for treatment of injuries, most after breathing smoke and gases 
from burning tritonal. No one was fatally injured.7 
The NTSB went onto recommend that DOD’s program for ensuring the safe transportation 
of munitions should be significantly improved. Specifically, NTSB recommended that:
DOD ... upgrade its munitions transportation safety program and ... provide thermal 
protection for explosives shipments. The Safety Board also issued recommendations 
to the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) to require thermal 
protection for explosives shipments and to increase recommended minimum 
evacuation distances for explosives shipments involved in fire. The Safety Board 
reiterated recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration and the RSPA 
to eliminate ambiguities in the routing requirements for vehicles transporting 
hazardous materials, to encourage states to establish through routes for shipments 
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of hazardous materials and to coordinate the compatibility of the designated routes 
regionally and nationally.
These accidents also prompted the Navy Department to institute a vehicle tracking system, 
using cellular and, later, satellite communications; to institute a command center and 
procedures to continually track vehicles carrying AA&E; and to provide accurate information 
to first responders. DOD then used this same system to track all AA&E shipments carried 
by various modes, including trucks, and gradually improved its capabilities. It now operates 
under the control of SDDC.
In addition to participating in DTTS, motor carriers of AA&E must also comply with stringent 
security standards. A critical review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) following 
the 9/11 attacks found the standards inadequate, and they were subsequently raised. 
DTTS and the security measures work together to provide security for AA&E shipments. 
DTTS is an integral part of DOD’s security approach, not a standalone system.
The minimum, baseline measures that apply to all commodities at the lowest force-
protection conditions (FPCONs) are laid out in DOD regulations8 and can be categorized 
according to purpose:  
To Verify That Drivers and Other Employees are Trusted
All commercial drivers must carry adequate identification that verifies their affiliation 1. 
with the carrier(s) named on the bill of lading. Drivers must also carry a driver’s 
license, medical qualification card, and employee record card, one of which must 
contain the driver’s photograph.
Drivers, escorts, operations and driver/fleet managers, dispatchers, router/load 2. 
planners, and facility security officers from commercial companies must have 
DOD SECRET security clearances obtained through the DOD Industrial Security 
Program.
Hazmat/compliance personnel, terminal manager personnel, government sales 3. 
representatives, computer programmers or technicians supporting transit operations, 
and any other personnel with prior knowledge of shipments may require SECRET 
clearances if they receive advance notification of information regarding DOD AA&E 
Protective Security Service (PSS) or SECRET shipments. 
To Ensure the Security of the Terminal and Vehicles When They are Loaded and Unloaded 
Carriers can use CCTV if it is approved beforehand, the TV is monitored 24/7, and 1. 
personnel can immediately respond to incidents.
Security cages must be fabricated from commercial steel grating panels; walls, 2. 
doors, floors, and ceiling must provide protection equivalent to the steel grating to 
preclude forced entry. 
Signature and tally-record service are required for each person handling the 3. 
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shipment; each person responsible has to sign the record at each point where the 
cargo is transferred. 
Containers or vehicles utilized as AA&E conveyances must be sealed with specialized 4. 
equipment, and the seals must be inspected regularly.
To Protect Trucks and Loads En Route 
All AA&E shipments must have two qualified drivers in the truck and must be under constant 
surveillance, which consists of the following protocols:
The vehicle must be attended at all times by a qualified representative of the carrier; •	
the representative must be awake and either inside the vehicle cab or within 25 feet 
of the vehicle, with a constant, unobstructed view. 
 
During lengthy stops, the vehicle must be parked at a DOD-approved facility and •	
either monitored by a qualified representative of the carrier or facility with the 
shipment in full view and within 25 feet or secured in an adequately lighted area 
surrounded by at least a 6-foot chain link fence and continuously patrolled, or placed 
in a security cage. 
Stops of more than four hours’ duration must occur at a secure holding facility on a •	
military installation.
The trailer must always be connected with the power unit during shipment, except •	
during loading and servicing, at a carrier-designated point where the driver maintains 
constant surveillance during disconnection, at an approved state or local secure 
holding location, or, in emergencies, at a DOD secure holding location.
The tractor must be equipped with two of the following means of communication: a •	
mobile communications unit, CB radio, or cellular telephone.
The carrier must be able to trace a shipment in less than one hour.•	
The carrier must notify the consignee by telephone if a shipment cannot reach the •	
consignee within 24 hours of the agreed-upon delivery date.
The carrier must provide dual drivers when the shipping distance exceeds 250 •	
miles.
In addition, for higher-risk Category I and II shipments, certain additional measures have 
to be applied, the most important being the requirement for two drivers, one of which must 
have a SECRET clearance and the other of which must have one in progress, and the 
mandatory use of DOD-approved secure holding facilities (including a protected cage or a 
vault) for any stop. In addition, security escort vehicles (SEVs) are needed for the highest-
risk (Category I) shipments. 
At the highest FPCON (Delta), only essential shipments, which must receive prior 
authorization, are transported. For these shipments, the highest security measures are 
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required, including SEVs, two SECRET-cleared drivers, and stop-offs only at DOD-
approved facilities.
Technical Components of DTTS
Current:
Tracks far more frequently than in normal trucking applications, using QUALCOMM • 
satellite units
Uses shipper and driver electronic messaging to compare planned to actual movement• 
Has manifest data (mostly electronic), so load is known• 
Evaluates alarms (about 100 in one year,  mostly (1) 64 accidents, (2) some communication • 
failures, (3) mechanical breakdowns, and a few instances of  suspicious criminal  
behavior)
Uses panic alarms• 
Uses geofencing, but only for national security events; pushes frequency to a much higher • 
rate
Uses system in conjunction with driver and law enforcement officer (LEO) communication• 
Future:
Experimenting with vehicle immobilization technologies (VITs)• 
characteristics of dtts 
The key technical characteristics of the system are described below.
Electronic messages from the shipper and receiver of any covered shipment on •	
its scheduled pickup and delivery time and point, and from the driver, provide 
DTTS with the truck’s estimated pickup and delivery times. The driver sends 
different messages to the system, indicating that he is beginning to move, or that 
he is stopping for a rest, or that he is starting again, or that he has reached his 
destination. Together, these messages provide a baseline state against which the 
actual movement of the vehicle can be compared.  
Vehicle tracking through a transmitter located on the truck and a QUALCOMM •	
satellite communications network provide the actual performance of the vehicle, 
with a normal preset communications frequency. Once the driver picks up the 
shipment and activates the system, the vehicle begins to emit a signal. If the driver 
decides to stop, he sends a message to the system, and the signal on the vehicle 
now indicates that the truck is stationary. When the driver starts to drive again, he 
sends another message, and the system sees that the vehicle is moving. At every 
step, the systems software that DTTS uses automatically generates an “exception 
report” if the vehicle is behaving differently from what the driver has messaged or if 
there is a loss of signal, which can happen occasionally due to technical problems. 
Whenever there is an exception, DTTS managers contact the company dispatch 
center first to determine whether they can get in touch with the driver to verify that 
there is no threat or dangerous situation. If that is unsuccessful, local and state 
police are alerted. Each exception report is evaluated before authorities decide that 
a critical, high-risk event is occurring. 
Each driver has the ability to press a panic alarm, which alerts DTTS that there is •	
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a problem. In one year in which over 60,000 shipments were made, just over 100 
alarms were sent. Of these, 64 involved accidents. Other alarms occurred when 
satellite communications died. Drivers have also issued alarms when they noted 
suspicious behavior (such as being followed or photographed), if there has been a 
mechanical breakdown, or, in very rare cases, if someone has fired on them (every 
occurrence of this has been an act of vandalism or shooting practice done too close 
to a highway). Again, in every case, company dispatch is contacted to determine the 
source of the problem before law enforcement is contacted. 
DTTS has the ability to geofence anything, and when it does, the frequency of •	
transmission can be increased substantially. However, geofencing is usually 
instituted only where there is a national-security event—a large, high-profile event 
(such as the Super Bowl) or the appearance of a dignitary (such as the president)—
and not to construct an assigned route. Carriers are expected to use best practices 
and efficiency in choosing routes. 
Interviews with DOD personnel indicated that acquiring and keeping a set of drivers and 
other personnel with SECRET clearances was the most difficult and presumably costly 
operational requirement for motor carriers.
technologies and capabilities not yet included 
DTTS does not yet include biometric or other more-sophisticated access controls to the 
trucks. Also, vehicle immobilization technologies (VITs) are not incorporated, although 
discussions and experiments with VITs have been conducted. The safety risks of a hard 
shutdown are considered too significant to justify implementation. Softer or more-intelligent 
shutdowns (or, as they are called, “forcing the vehicle into a limp mode”) are also being 
considered and might be implemented in the future. 
However, recent conversations with DOD indicate that the DTTS Project Management 
Office (PMO) intends to start implementing a trailer tracking system in April 2008 to take 
advantage of the growing commercial trends in use of tracking to find lost or stolen high-
value cargo. In such systems, a transmitter with “sleep cycles” that uses increased battery 
power is activated by the dispatch office. It “wakes up” at frequent intervals and notes 
whether the trailer is untethered, whether it is stopped or moving, and whether the cargo 
doors are open. If any of these events take place out of the planned sequence of the trip, 
an exception report is generated, and the trailer will begin transmitting more frequently until 
the exception is resolved.
DTTS itself provides no additional ability to deal with an event involving a coerced driver or 
an insider hijacking if the preventive security measures do not work, and it thus relies on 
those measures to protect against hijackings, which are very robust. 
The total cost of DTTS and the SDDC-mandated security measures could not be attained 
because they vary by carrier and are built into the rate structure. However, the following 
anecdotal and illustrative data were provided by DOD officials.9
The startup cost per truck using the QUALCOMM system for DTTS truck-tracking •	
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varies, depending on whether a communications package has already been 
implemented. The estimated cost of installation is between $3,000 and $4,000 per 
truck, and the operating cost per truck is between $75 and $110 a year. Interestingly, 
DOD pays QUALCOMM for three additional communication feeds to the satellite 
system (to increase the rate from once an hour for the normal commercial package 
to the required higher normal rate). Based on an estimated active fleet of 1,591 
trucks, the DTTS systemwide annual cost paid directly by DOD is between $300,000 
and $400,000. 
Assuming 60,000 shipments a year with three trailers per truck, the per-load cost of •	
DTTS trailer tracking is estimated to be between $180 and $326 for the first year, 
then $37 to $48 per truck for subsequent years, with the five-year average cost 
being between $67 and $104. This cost includes all maintenance, operations, and 
a profit margin. 
Carriers charge DOD $1.00 to $2.00 for CIS service, between $1.00 and $3.20 a •	
mile for SEVs, and between $1.00 and $2.50 per mile for an extra driver. 
Illustrative DTTS Costs
Truck tracking 
Start-up costs:  $3,000 to $4,000 per truck• 
Annual operating costs:  $75 to $110 a year• 
Fleetwide annual DOD costs for 15-minute communication cycle:  $300,000 to $400,000• 
Trailer tracking
Average 5-year annual cost:  $67 to $104 per truck• 
Assumes 60,000 shipments and 3 trailers per truck• 
Covers all costs plus profit margin• 
Other security measures
Constant surveillance:  $1.00 to $2.00 per mile• 
Extra driver:  $1.00 to $2.50 per mile• 
Escort service:  $1.00 to $3.20 per mile• 
lessons from dtts 
Several interesting observations can be gained from DOD’s experience with DTTS.
First, DTTS was created because of two accidents which, while they did not cause major 
loss of life (compared to the potential loss they could have caused), created significant 
economic harm and revealed problems in security and emergency response. Also, 
subsequent improvements in DTTS were prompted by outside GAO reviews. The GAO 
reviews found motor-carrier terminal security for very sensitive materials to be inadequate, 
and DOD has taken measures to ensure carrier terminals meet stringent security standards 
before being approved by DOD for use. 
Second, despite the sensitivity of the cargo carried under DTTS, a government threat 
analysis determined that no general or specific credible threat of hijacking and misuse of 
these DOD materials existed. 
Third, vehicle tracking is not cheap. Costs for a smaller, discrete fleet that are reimbursed 
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have little relevance for a large tanker fleet. 
Fourth, technology innovation has been gradual. Biometric controls have not yet 
been implemented, trailer tracking is being implemented, and intelligent VIT is being 
considered. 
Fifth, there is limited use of geofencing, although DTTS is capable of implementing it 
anywhere. This suggests that DOD’s assessment of security risks is low or its confidence 
in its security measures is high. 
Sixth, vehicle tracking is used only in conjunction with stringent security measures and 
regular and mandatory electronic messages sent from drivers. Also, any exception alert is 
checked out with the company dispatch center before it is communicated to responders 
or law enforcement. This is important, because if the agency most experienced in vehicle 
tracking will not use it as a standalone defensive measure, neither should a state or other 
federal agencies.
Seventh, DOD relies on the requirement for drivers and certain other employees to have 
SECRET clearances and other internal measures to guard against insider attacks or drivers 
who have been coerced, not vehicle tracking itself. 
Finally, DOD officials indicated that while TSA is aware of DOD experience, they may not 
make full utilization of DOD’s experience in DTTS. According to one official, “We’ve been 
doing this for 20 years and it seems TSA wants to learn the same lessons over again.”  Any 
implementing authority might want to actively engage DOD as well as TSA, to determine 
lessons learned.
DTTS:  Key Observations
Little or no risk of attack is assessed.• 
System was created after an accident, improved in response to criticism.• 
Expensive DOD security measures are applied to a reimbursed small fleet and may not • 
applicable to a large tanker fleet.
Geofencing and route restrictions are seldom used.• 
Technology innovation has been gradual.• 
DTTS operates as part of a set of strong security measures.• 
DTTS data are not the only type of information used to evaluate alarms and respond to • 
true emergencies.
It is unclear whether TSA has taken full advantage of DOD experience.• 
federal motor carrier safety administration pilots 
 
Particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, there has been 
considerable interest in creating a vehicle tracking system for certain hazardous materials 
railroad and highway carriers. To its credit, FMCSA seems to have taken the lead in studying 
the feasibility and benefits of applying vehicle tracking and associated technologies to 
increase security and safety for hazardous materials highway shipments and efficiency for 
motor carrier fleets in general. FMCSA conducted four related but separate tests of vehicle 
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tracking and related technologies that can improve security, safety, and efficiency. These 
pilots were:
1. The Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Field Operational Test (FOT) 
Initiated by DOT in 2002,  this comprehensive evaluation was designed to quantify the costs 
and benefits of an operational concept that applied technology and improved enforcement 
procedures to highway hazardous materials transportation and included a six-month field 
test of various technologies, including vehicle and load (trailer) tracking using satellite and 
other wireless systems; driver verification using password logins, fingerprint biometrics, 
and smart cards; geofencing; cargo tampering alerts, using electronic seals; and panic 
buttons and remote vehicle disabling. Because this study included an analysis of terrorist 
attacks and threats, touched in some way on all of the technologies that could increase 
security for gasoline tankers, and is the only report specifically mentioned in the legislation 
mandating the TSA pilot project,  it is discussed extensively in this report.10
2. Untethered Trailer Tracking (UTT) and Control System Pilot Test  
Even as the FOT evaluation began, FMCSA received a congressional earmark on October 
7, 2002, to develop and field test a UTT system for high-value or high-security-risk loads, 
such as explosives. Congress determined that the requirements to be tested include real-
time trailer identification, location, geofencing, unscheduled movement notification, door 
sensors, and alarms.11 The three-month pilot test conducted between October 2004 and 
January 2005 involved several vendors and carriers and used three different scenarios 
(each involving 25 trailers). One of them involved standard dry van deliveries, another 
involved high-value retail clothing and electronics, and the third involved regional truckload 
deliveries of explosives. A final report was issued in December 2005.12  
The report indicates that the UTT system functioned with relatively few technical problems, 
utilizing different combinations of data transmitted by satellite to the carrier on whether or 
not a trailer door was opened, whether or not it was loaded with cargo, and its location 
in relation to a geofenced perimeter, all aimed at notifying the carrier when there was an 
unauthorized movement or opening of the trailer. It concluded that UTT offered security 
benefits through the increased real-time knowledge about the movement and condition of 
untethered trailers carrying hazardous materials that could be stolen, tampered with, or 
delivered illicitly to a target. It also cautioned that technology must be applied together with 
other security measures and not as standalone systems. 
The report also concluded that UTT provided economic gains through reduction in the theft 
of cargo—particularly high-value cargo—and, perhaps even more important, significant 
efficiency gains by reducing the time spent locating misplaced trailers or trailers not ready 
for loading.
Because it is apparently difficult to untether a fully loaded tanker trailer safely, MTI will not 
examine further the implications of this study during this phase of its work. UTT systems 
may well, however, be examined in greater depth if MTI considers other high-risk hazmat 
that can be stolen by untethering a trailer. 
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3. Expanded Satellite-Based Mobile Communications Tracking System Pilot Test 
On November 25, 2003, Congress earmarked $2 million of FMCSA’s FY04 appropriations13 
to test an effective, wireless, satellite-based communications tracking system to monitor 
hazardous materials and high-value cargo in areas where satellite coverage is unreliable 
or nonexistent. The areas tested were in Alaska and Hawaii. Three technologies were 
tested: UTT, panic buttons, and an expanded satellite-based mobile communications 
tracking (ESCT) system. The tests involved four carriers with a total of 62 tractors and 58 
trailers in Alaska, and one carrier and five trucks in Hawaii. Critical areas were defined 
where technology-based tracking was not available, and a test was then conducted to 
demonstrate functionality of ESCT and the other technologies in these areas. The test 
showed both improved coverage and that the three technologies increased security, safety, 
and efficiency. According to FMCSA, the primary value of this project was an improvement 
in communications for tracking hazardous materials in Alaska. A final report was issued in 
June 2007.14
MTI’s analysis of attacks involving gasoline tankers suggests that they are most likely to 
be used to create casualties in areas where population densities are high, and when they 
are acquired and used close to those population areas. Moreover, some states presumably 
have few areas where satellite coverage gaps are as large as they are in Alaska. We 
therefore note that an ESCT may be needed as an adjunct but have not focused on it in 
this report.
4. Vehicle Disabling Technology Study  
On November 19, 2004, Congress again earmarked $250,000 out of FMCSA’s programs 
and directed that the testing done during the FOT continue with a specific focus on vehicle 
disabling and shutdown technologies.15  A primary goal of the project is to develop best 
practices for using these technologies, gathered through information from vendors, 
stakeholders, and field demonstrations. Another primary component will be development 
of a concept of operations covering state law-enforcement interaction with carriers that 
utilize vehicle disabling technologies. 
Because vehicle disabling initiated locally and remotely is such an important potential 
strategy to mitigate risks, and because the technology is specifically mentioned in the 
congressional guidance for the TSA pilot project, MTI has treated it in considerable detail in 
this report. (At the time of publication, MTI used extensive interviews with FMCSA staff and 
briefing charts. FMCSA has just issued a full report, providing this information in detail.16)
fmcsa and the field operations test
What became known as the FOT of a vehicle and trailer tracking system was conducted in 
2003–2004.17  The test was focused on four segments of the hazardous materials industry: 
(1) bulk petroleum (particularly gasoline), (2) bulk chemicals, (3) less-than-truckload (LTL) 
shipments of various commodities, and (4) explosives. The attack scenarios included 
theft, interception/diversion (e.g., hijacking), and legal exploitation (the purchase and 
subsequent misuse of a vehicle). FMCSA tested a total of 25 vehicles for each scenario 
and tried out a combination of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to determine 
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their effectiveness in stopping an attack. It estimated the benefits in this priority order: 
security, operational efficiency, and safety. It then estimated the cost of implementation 
and estimated the overall benefit-cost ratio to determine whether industry deployment 
might take place without government intervention or support. The study was carefully 
done and independently evaluated. 
As a critical part of this effort, FMCSA also commissioned Battelle to evaluate hazardous 
materials to determine which posed the greatest risks from a security and safety standpoint. 
This evaluation, which is classified as Sensitive Security Information, has been analyzed 
by MTI staff, and those analyses have helped to inform and shape the attack scenarios 
presented in MTI Report 09-03, Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway-Borne Hazardous 
Materials, in the chapter titled “Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks.” 
Some of the most important findings from the unclassified executive summary of the 
Battelle report, which may be of particular significance to any state or other authority are 
discussed below. 
technology performance. With the exception of biometric login and E-seals—which must 
be redesigned to be more user-friendly for the ordinary driver—all technologies performed 
well. Most notable among these were:
Wireless, satellite-based communications with GPS tracking•	
Driver panic buttons•	
On-command and automatic vehicle disabling (the latter created through an •	
onboard computer that could be configured to prompt a vehicle shutdown if the 
vehicle was tampered with)    
Trailer tracking (to prevent a trailer from being disconnected from the tractor and •	
stolen)
Geofencing of certain locations to cause an automatic alert (and potential disabling) •	
of vehicles approaching too closely
FMCSA reports that some of these features, such as vehicle disabling, have been improved 
significantly since the test to make them safer and more reliable, while experience with 
others, such as panic buttons, has increased.
Security Benefits. While the technology performed well, the test revealed that when all 
security threats were considered, “technology, alone, at best could address approximately 
one third of the potential hazmat-based vulnerabilities.”  The greatest benefits were attained 
when a panic alert system, remote disabling, and satellite tracking were combined. The 
cost-benefit calculation of this combination for bulk fuel vehicles equipped with wireless 
communication was significant (2.6:1), but only when “worst-case attack consequences” 
were considered. These events are specified in the SSI-protected report; however, FMCSA 
staff indicated that gasoline tanker accidents were not included in these scenarios. It may be 
that except when high-consequence materials are involved, safety and efficiency benefits 
will have to be paramount in any decision to implement a vehicle tracking system as cost 
beneficial—such as for gasoline tankers—with important security benefits following. 
FMCSA found that partial implementation does not yield directly proportional security benefits: 
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It should be noted that partial deployment might not necessarily result in a directly 
proportional security benefit. In other words, 50% deployment may not yield 50% 
of the achievable security benefits. This may occur because while the technology-
equipped fleet may not be attacked, a non-equipped fleet would possibly be targeted 
instead  The deterrent effect of the technologies, if partly deployed, could simply shift 
terrorist targeting from one fleet to another, with no net change in overall security. 
Under this assumption then, full deployment is required to achieve the security 
results.18
Safety Benefits. The test showed that the ability to monitor driver performance and 
to intervene when an unsafe pattern is detected, along with the potential of increasing 
emergency response, increased safety significantly. In addition, FMCSA estimated a total 
annual industry-wide savings of $5 million a year for the hazardous materials covered by 
its pilot study.19  
Efficiency Benefits. The test showed that productivity gains could be achieved if a wireless/
GPS (i.e., satellite-based) system were used. The ability to track the time spent by drivers 
on the road, to find untethered trailers easily, and to save labor and fuel costs produced 
such significant benefits that the investment required to equip the fleet could be recouped 
in one year or less across the various implementation scenarios. Approximately $1 billion 
per year of net benefits would be gained thereafter across the industry. Driver productivity 
would increase 11% for bulk fuel carriers, and average savings would be $5,000 per year 
per truck for bulk carriers.
public sector reporting center concept. The test included consideration of a consolidated 
public sector reporting center (PSRC). It found that if procedural issues are not carefully 
resolved, such a center could be counterproductive. MTI’s own independent evaluation of 
what is needed to maintain and enhance, and not degrade, emergency response coincides 
with the following conclusion:
As a proof of concept, the PSRC demonstrates the ability to fuse and disseminate 
critical HAZMAT information in a timely manner to enhance enforcement response 
to security events. In expanding the PSRC concept to a full deployment scenario, 
significant institutional/procedural issues will have to be addressed. Among the 
more important of these are the administration of information and the notification 
process, i.e., ensuring that shipment information, alert notification levels (triggers) 
and key persons to be notified are current and complete. If not, the effectiveness of 
the system may be significantly eroded by alerts being directed to personnel and 
agencies that may not be involved in responding to given events or that appropriate 
persons/agencies may not be alerted when actually warranted, or that information 
provided is lacking or inaccurate. In either case, confidence in the PSRC and 
the ability to readily use alert and shipment background information provided via 
the PSRC is at stake. Addressing this will require coordination, continuity and 
uniformity of process among shippers/consignees, HAZMAT motor carriers, and the 
enforcement/emergency response communities.20
FMCSA completed its test, evaluated overall benefits and costs, and concluded that despite 
the benefits of implementing new technologies—particularly of wireless and GPS tracking—
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to individual firms and the industry, “market forces are unlikely to support strong adoption of 
the technologies, at least in the foreseeable future,” suggesting that government financial 
support or regulation is needed if a vehicle tracking system is to be implemented. 
2003–2004 FMCSA Field Operational Test
COTS technology, including panic buttons, vehicle disabling, and satellite-based tracking, • 
works well, with few exceptions.
Technological solutions show promise but, alone, “at best, could only address approximately • 
one-third of the potential HAZMAT-based vulnerabilities.” However, improved security 
measures that include technology could significantly reduce vulnerabilities. 
Security requirements necessitate equipping 100% of the targeted fleet.• 
Safety benefits are significant.• 
Efficiency benefits are significant, suggesting a $1 billion net return on investment annually. • 
A public sector reporting center requires all procedural and operational issues to be worked • 
out carefully. Otherwise, security and safety benefits can be lost. 
Cost of implementation may necessitate government support or regulation. • 
fmcsa’s follow-on Work on vehicle immobilization technologies
The FMCSA report covered all aspects of vehicle tracking and was instrumental in 
shaping government and TSA thinking. FMCSA went on to perform an in-depth review and 
demonstration of VITs, with Oak Ridge National Laboratories as the prime contractor. A 
public report is forthcoming. MTI received an advance copy of the FMCSA briefing charts 
and also interviewed FMCSA staff on November 26, 2007.
Vehicle immobilization is a crucial technological innovation. The ability to safely and swiftly 
disable a truck carrying hazardous materials can offer significant security benefits in at 
least three basic scenarios:
A truck can be equipped so that it cannot be started without evidence that the 1. 
driver is authorized, e.g., by the driver using a swipe or magnetic card, a PIN, or 
a biometric device.
A driver who observes a vehicle that has been stolen or hijacked can activate the 2. 
VIT capability within sight of the vehicle by pushing a panic button on a key fob. 
The same method could be used by a company employee or police officer who 
is monitoring or following the truck, if they were given the coded key fob for that 
vehicle.
If the vehicle tracking signal is lost or the signal indicates that the truck is moving 3. 
away from an assigned route or approaching a geofenced area, a company or 
public center can be notified and can decide, after some verification, that the 
vehicle should be immobilized. This can be done remotely.
The immobilization command can be accomplished in one of two ways. First, it can activate 
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a “hard” shutdown, causing an immediate loss of power. However, in the wrong traffic and 
road environment, a hard shutdown could have significant safety ramifications. Second, 
more-sophisticated but proven technology can be used to gradually impair the engine’s 
performance so that the vehicle is slowly brought to a halt. 
FMCSA conducted workshops, web teleconferences, and meetings with stakeholders in 
spring 2007, and actual demonstration tests were performed at Laurens Proving Ground 
in South Carolina. The objective was to document best practices on the use of VITs in 
commercial vehicle operations, to develop a concept of operations on how VITs should be 
used by law enforcement, and to focus on driver authentication as a first line of defense. 
The initial briefing and a preliminary final briefing were given in advance to MTI. FMCSA 
has since issued its final public report on November 2007.21
FMCSA started with five functional requirements (FRs), which it “binned” into the three 
basic scenarios mentioned above.  
In the first functional requirement (FR1), FMCSA examined technologies that can disable 
a vehicle if an unauthorized driver attempts to operate it. FMCSA and industry view this 
as a first line of defense, and the use of driver authentication technologies is considered 
key. Such technologies can include login devices (similar to the login required to start a 
computer), proximity and swipe cards, and biometric readers. Login techniques, proximity 
cards, and wide cards were found easy to use and relatively inexpensive. Biometric 
techniques tended to be invasive and more expensive. All of these technologies can be 
combined with fail-safe activation, in which failure to input the correct sequence or code 
could automatically kill the engine or keep it from starting.
The benefits of such technologies are obvious for the industry: They can prevent simple 
theft which, for high-value cargo, can cause significant loss. Also, they can prevent hijacking 
by certain insiders with limited knowledge, or by intruders. However, each countermeasure 
only raises the bar of operational planning. 
In FR3, FMCSA examined remote shutdown that could be activated by a driver using 
a panic button. This feature worked well. It could prevent or stop simple theft or poorly 
planned hijackings—ones in which the hijacker, unaware of this disabling technology, 
leaves the driver free to disable the vehicle, especially if he can covertly enter a distress 
code. In addition, and although not specifically addressed by FMCSA, the same capability 
could be provided to any official who can approach the vehicle—as long as he or she could 
recover the key fob from the driver—and it is certainly less dangerous than shooting out 
the tires or firing into the engine block.
In FR2, FR4, and FR5, FMCSA examined a remote shutdown of the vehicle in the following 
three situations:
In FR2, the loss of signal—which could presumably be caused • 
by an intentional disabling of the satellite tracking system—
generates an automatic shutdown. However, while some vendors 
are offering this capability, there is little interest in procuring it yet. 
In FR4, the company dispatcher, upon receiving some indication of a problem—a • 
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call from the driver, an observation from another party, the vehicle traveling off 
route, or violation of a geofence restriction—immobilizes the vehicle. 
In FR5, law enforcement is alerted that there is a potential security problem, • 
such as a hijacking, and asks for immobilization to be ordered by a company 
dispatch operation or a PSRC. The demonstration showed that for legal and 
liability reasons, law enforcement strongly prefers to provide information to the 
dispatch center about the vehicle so that a shutdown can be executed and is 
extremely reluctant to initiate or order the shutdown itself. 
A key part of FMCSA’s final product is a set of best practices22  for government and industry 
to consider:  
Degrading a truck’s performance is safer than a complete shutdown. Safety • 
is further enhanced if the system is able to sense the roadway environment of 
the truck—whether it is on a curve, the slope of the road at the moment, and 
whether it is in traffic. Generally, slow degradation is considered to effectively 
achieve the security objective and minimize inadvertent creation of safety 
issues. However, companies and vendors expressed differing views on “hard” 
shut-downs, some wanting to avoid them at all costs and others indicating they 
would use them quickly and on command. 
It is important to provide disabling techniques that can protect the driver and • 
allow him or her to activate an alarm in a way that is both effective and not 
detectable by a hijacker.
It is always best to have “eyes on” the vehicle that is to be disabled. If a • 
hijacked or suspicious vehicle is identified far enough away from the target, law 
enforcement aerial or ground surveillance can help determine when and how 
to activate the command and immobilize the vehicle safely. Conversely, low-
earth-orbit surveillance may be able to determine that the signal is inadvertent 
and avoid wasting valuable security resources. FMCSA has recommended that 
in conjunction with such surveillance, flashing tail lights or some technique that 
clearly identifies the vehicle should be instituted to make it easier to acquire 
visually. If time allows, some kind of visual contact with the vehicle is needed to 
ensure that alerts are genuine and that the response is safe.
It is important for the entire system to have high security to eliminate the possibility • 
of spoofing and also to reduce the possibility of false alarms and inadvertent 
deactivations. High security requires redundancy in both communications and 
backup power.
It is important to ensure that public, vendor, or carrier centers that can initiate • 
disabling commands are clear on which alarms gain the most attention so that 
false alarms can be reduced, the speed of response to true positive alarms can 
be increased, and accurate information can be provided to law enforcement 
and first responders. 
FMCSA and Oak Ridge National Laboratory officials also revealed the following 
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insights:23
The rate of commercial, voluntary deployment of driver-authentication and • 
vehicle-tracking technologies is much higher than was anticipated. This is due 
to (a) the economic benefits of avoided theft of high-value shipments; (b) the 
increased efficiency that vehicle tracking can bring for fleet management in 
general; (c) the increased safety afforded drivers; and (d) insurance-company 
practices that examine each trucking company’s posture regarding best practices 
and, in general, relatively low costs. The rate of commercial adaptation of vehicle 
immobilization, on the other hand, is moving less swiftly, and this may, in fact, 
require governmental encouragement, guidance, or mandate. 
It is also possible that government-mandated systems could actually slow down • 
the rate of commercial deployment if shippers and insurers begin to look to a 
government system as the de facto “best practice.” (Carriers participating in 
DOD’s DTTS are considered a unique, smaller, and specialized market.) 
No aspect of the technologies—including satellite communications, technical • 
standards and protocols to interface with existing systems, panic alerts and 
buttons, and even remote vehicle immobilization—poses an insurmountable 
challenge. Many of these technologies are at or close to COTS status. 
Cost is driven primarily by whether or not a communications system has already • 
been put in place. If it has been, the added cost of initial installation can be as low 
as $500 per truck, with additional per-truck costs as low as $5.24  However, costs 
increase dramatically with the rate of communications reporting. The standard 
commercial rate is once every hour; the DOD rate is much higher. In a defensive 
situation involving geofencing of certain key targets (see below), the rate might 
have to be even higher in order to organize a response before critical damage 
is done. 
Cost is also a function of the kind of hazmat motor carrier segment being • 
tracked. Some high-consequence hazmat shippers—both large and small—are 
security conscious already and have invested heavily in security procedures and 
technology. In some industries, however, such as combustible gases (propane) 
and flammable liquids (gasoline), investments may be small. On the other hand, 
these industries are consolidating, and larger firms may well be able to foot the 
bill, while the number of smaller firms decreases each year. Although it is not 
economically desirable, this certainly poses security advantages. 
Regarding the claim that tracking trucks or tractors rather than loads or trailers • 
is the wrong approach, FMCSA indicated that it is highly unusual, and often 
unsafe, for some hazmat loads to be disconnected from tractors. Specifically, 
disconnecting a full tank trailer from the tractor would likely cause the front mounts 
to collapse. The photograph below, taken in November of 2007, vividly illustrates 
the point: The tank trailer overturned when this maneuver was attempted.
Although it is possible that terrorists could simply engineer their way around • 
tracked trucks by connecting loads to untracked trucks, in practical terms, 
this may be difficult, if not impossible, to do, particularly for flammable liquids. 
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Nevertheless, a disconnect alert—such as was tested in the FOT—could be a 
good adjunct system, and it would be powered by the unit on the truck.
overturned tank trailer—november 2007figure 1  
geofencing, vehicle tracking, and vehicle-immobilization technologies
Because it is almost certain that relatively few targets will be considered critical enough to 
be protected, the combination of geofencing, vehicle tracking, and vehicle immobilization 
is important to consider as a risk-mitigation strategy.
Technically, such a solution is possible; tracking, geofencing, and immobilization have 
all been tested. Geofencing, defined in concentric rings from a target, also allows for a 
graduated response to a vehicle that can pose a threat. The further out from the target the 
vehicle is, the more time the company or PSRC has to determine if an exception alert is a 
false alarm or, if it is a true alarm, to shut the vehicle down safely. 
However, there are important related operational and cost issues:
The rate of communication has to be high and reliable; the commercial rate of • 
once an hour will not suffice. A higher communication rate increases the cost 
per carrier. Also, the most reliable method of ensuring frequent communication 
appears to be equipping each truck cab with a transmitter that can alternate 
between ground and satellite receivers as needed. This is also expensive. The 
bottom line is that more-frequent tracking, combined with the need to equip all 
trucks in a fleet, increases costs.
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An alarm, and possibly even deactivation, is required in the event of loss of • 
signal. Since cutting a cable can make a hijacked vehicle “blind” to the control 
center, vehicles must become disabled or at least send an alert if signal is lost. 
This results in yet more costs and operational issues.
Vehicle Immobilization Technology (VIT)
Public report has been issued; MTI was briefed in advance.• 
VIT works in three scenarios:• 
      • Start is attempted by an unauthorized driver
      • Driver sees hijacked vehicle and uses panic alarm
      • Tracking center issues shutdown after evaluating:
          • Loss of signal
          • Call from company dispatch, contacted by driver or observer
          • Movement outside of planned route or into geofenced area.
Two types of remote shutdowns:• 
     • Hard kill of engine (hard shutdown)
     • Speed is reduced, then engine is shut down (soft shutdown). 
No significant technical hurdles • 
     • Vehicle tracking and driver authentication are progressing rapidly 
     • Panic alarms are reliable
     • Trailer tracking is progressing to achieve efficiency and avoid high-value theft 
       (not needed for tankers)
     • Much progress has been made in VIT but implementation is slow 
     • No vendor is offering VIT for loss of signal.
Cost is driven by whether communication system already exists and also by rate of • 
communication.
Best practices• 
     • Soft shutdown is safer: intelligent systems consider speed, road, traffic
     • Keep “eyes on vehicle”: helped by distinguishing it with flashing red lights
     • Protect the driver with soft shutdowns and secret alarms
     • 100% tracking requires redundancy in communications and power
     • High security is needed to prevent spoofing
     • Practice procedures to distinguish false from true alarms.
The geographic area in which the tracking infrastructure exists has to be relatively • 
devoid of the type of traffic being monitored. For liquid flammables, that means 
complete rerouting away from the target, so that vehicles that are “off route” are 
automatically noticed. For example, if there are gas stations near the target, how 
would the legal movements of gasoline trucks be differentiated from illegitimate 
movements in time to react?  Geofencing essentially requires a complete 
prohibition of a particular hazmat from being anywhere near the target. 
The safety issues involved in implementing automatic, unmonitored vehicle • 
disabling as a last resort are significant. It is one thing to disable a vehicle while 
law enforcement monitors it; it is another to do it blindly—although this is still 
better than allowing a suspicious shipment to come close to a target. 
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the tsa pilot project 
TSA has initiated a hazmat truck security pilot program, which Congress mandated and 
provided $11.5 million for in DHS’s FY07 appropriations legislation. The pilot is designed 
to test a vehicle tracking system that can operate in all 50 states; provides alerts against 
theft, hijacking, and other security threats; and, perhaps most important, uses a central 
tracking center, which would be managed by TSA and would be designed primarily to 
ensure a national response to a national-security incident. 
According to briefings given by TSA on October 14, 2007, and November 15, 2007, in 
Seattle and Washington, D.C., respectively, the system focuses on high-consequence 
hazmats such as TIH and PIH materials, truckload explosives, and certain substances 
controlled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It is also designed 
to be used primarily in high-threat situations. Field tests involving 10 carriers, seven 
vendors, and 128 trucks and regional public safety centers in New York, North Carolina, 
and Washington, D.C., will be concluded in December 2007; interim and final reports will 
be issued in spring 2008; and follow-on work will continue for three years (see details 
below). TSA has repeatedly emphasized its preference for voluntary implementation and 
that voluntary implementation was intended by Congress. 
The primary policy aim of the TSA pilot project is to develop a truck-tracking center (TTC) 
that will allow TSA to prevent attacks involving high-consequence hazmat that could cause 
mass casualties—essentially, to prevent another 9/11-type attack in which weaponized, 
high-consequence hazmat would be carried by truck. As TSA’s own briefing slides indicate, 
“The HAZMAT Truck Tracking Pilot is a congressionally mandated pilot project to design 
and build a centralized truck tracking center capability” in which “the desired outcome is to 
provide TSA with a tested and established truck tracking center capability that will allow 
TSA to ‘continually’ track truck locations and hazmat load types in all 50 states and to 
receive exception based events.”
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Highlights of Section 1554, “Motor Carrier Security-Sensitive Materials Tracking” of the 
9/11 Legislation
Not later than six months after enactment, the Secretary of DHS—consistent with TSA’s • 
current truck-security pilot—“shall develop a program to facilitate the tracking of motor 
carrier shipments of security-sensitive materials and to equip vehicles used in such shipments 
and technology” that provides:  
     (a) Frequent or continuous communications
     (b) Vehicle position location and tracking capabilities
     (c) A feature that allows a driver of such vehicles to broadcast an emergency
          distress signal.
The Secretary is further mandated to (a) consult with the DOT Secretary to coordinate • 
the program with any ongoing or planned efforts for motor carrier or security-sensitive 
materials at DOT; (b) take into consideration the FMSCA FOT report; (c) evaluate any new 
information and technologies not included in that test; and (d) consider the range of contact 
intervals, the use of automated disabling features, and the cost, benefits, and practicality of 
such an effort. 
The bill authorized $7 million for FY08, FY09, and FY010, allowing $3 million each year to • 
be used for equipment. 
The law requires a report within one year to the appropriate committees and requires the • 
Secretary of DHS to seek additional authority before mandating such a system.
It is important to read carefully the law regarding the scope and implementation of the 
pilot:  
The system must include the following high-consequence hazmat: Poison • 
Inhalation Hazards (PIH) materials, TIH materials, truckload explosives, and 
certain commodities designated by CDC. The Secretary of DHS can add other 
materials to this list by rulemaking. 
The system is to provide (a) tracking of vehicles that is “frequent and continuous” • 
and therefore requires satellite or a combination of satellite and terrestrial 
systems, (b) precise positioning of each vehicle, and (c) the ability of the driver 
to issue a panic alert (“an emergency distress signal”). TSA must study past 
and ongoing work (and specifically FMCSA’s work). TSA must also consider 
the advantages and costs of two key technological advances, but it does not 
mandate their implementation:  (1) increased “contact intervals” or reporting 
rates (such as those that would be required to work with a geofencing solution), 
and (2) “automatic disabling features,” e.g., VIT. 
The law mandates only that the DHS Secretary “develop” a given system that • 
includes certain commodities and certain technologies; the Secretary must also 
make use of certain past and ongoing studies and coordinate with the Secretary 
of Transportation; the addition of new commodities and certain new features, 
particularly those using VIT, must be considered. Finally, the DHS Secretary must 
return to Congress to seek authorization before issuing a rule that would mandate 
the use of the system. It is therefore fair to say that Congress wants DHS to 
prepare such a system for implementation, that it has set minimum requirements 
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for that system, and that it has neither declared that any implementation will 
be voluntary nor declared that there will be mandatory implementation. It has 
only mandated that DHS consult with Congress and seek authority before it 
mandates implementation of the system.
These facts are important because TSA has made statements (and has interpreted the 
law) for the industry in certain ways that allow MTI to offer some observations about the 
future direction of this pilot project. 
a focus on high-consequence hazmat in high-threat situations. TSA has 
emphasized that the focus of the pilot project is high-consequence hazardous materials 
(defined by the law as “security sensitive” materials and by TSA’s action lists as Tier 
1 highway security-sensitive hazardous materials [HSSM Tier 1]) such as TIH and PIH 
materials, truckload explosives, and certain CDC-controlled materials. At no time was it 
suggested that commodities assessed as having the potential to produce fewer maximum 
casualties be included. In fact, the emphasis in the study of “consequences” was primarily 
on casualties.
voluntary implementation as an insurance policy. While the law neither mandates 
implementation nor mandates that implementation be voluntary, at both briefings TSA 
stated that Congress had mandated voluntary implementation. More important, however, is 
the way TSA is positioning the pilot study and portraying the advantages of implementation 
to industry. Clearly, TSA has positioned it as a medium-term (three-year) rather than a 
short-term (one-year) project, one that seeks additional motor carrier participation and 
in which industry participation brings not only commercial efficiency benefits for many 
motor carriers—although not for all, particularly for those with very small fleets—but more 
important, provides insurance against sudden, emergency actions by the government in 
the event of an attack that involves hazmat, or should a threat assessment suggest that 
such attacks are imminent. TSA briefers made the point that it would be far better for 
Congress to mandate the implementation of a system that is tried and tested and has a 
high rate of voluntary participation by industry than to mandate implementation of a system 
that has not been properly tested. The bottom line is that TSA suggested to the industry 
that it should help prepare and embrace a system that works and can be implemented 
profitably before one that might not work as well, and is thrust upon it.
partial implementation. TSA briefers also suggested that partial implementation had 
significant security benefits and used the Federal Air Marshal (FAM) program as an 
example. The theory proffered was that just as aircraft hijackers did not know which flights 
FAMs were on and therefore had to assume they were on every flight, truck hijackers 
would have to assume all vehicles in certain fleets had vehicle-tracking and panic-button 
capability, even if only part of the fleet were actually equipped. 
There are serious problems with this rationale. First, it is far easier to restrict knowledge 
of which flights FAMS are on than to restrict knowledge of which vehicles are equipped 
with vehicle tracking. The number of staff who need to know about FAM access is infinitely 
smaller than the number who would need to know which trucks are equipped and which are 
not. Second, control of FAM-related information is more centralized. Third, the operational 
security measures that are applied to provide deterrent value for flights without FAMs are 
far less complex and expensive than those that would have to be applied to the many 
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people running, driving, and equipping entire commodity fleets. Finally, unless vehicle-
tracking antennas are completely obscured, it is likely that the equipment itself will be 
observable. No equipment that is so observable is used in the FAM program.
During the formal briefing, the MTI staff asked the TSA briefer to clarify his earlier statement, 
and much of what was suggested was retracted, although TSA still maintained that some 
security value is provided by partial implementation. 
The operational security needed to prevent hijackers from eliminating all the security value 
of the system by hijacking a truck that isn’t equipped is not feasible. Therefore, security 
benefits can be assumed to exist only when there is 100% fleet implementation, which 
requires mandatory, not voluntary, implementation.
past and future schedule and budget. TSA’s work on vehicle tracking is considered 
to have started with operational concept studies funded by congressional mandate in its 
FY03–FY06 appropriations legislation. These studies constituted Phase I. Phase II was 
associated with Section 1554 of the 9/11 act and commenced in October 2005. Using seven 
vendors and ten carriers, it began operating in June 2006 and became fully operational 
in September 2007. Phase II concluded its operational tests in December 2007. A final 
technical report was issued May 15, 2008. 
Future phases will involve additional volunteers and tests that are not yet outlined. TSA has 
secured a $7 annual budget from Congress, of which $3 million is to be used, in part, to 
purchase equipment to outfit a portion of a fleet that a motor-carrier volunteers for inclusion 
in the pilot. (For example, if ten trucks were volunteered, TSA would pay to equip five of 
them.)  This represents an opportunity to participate in the continued demonstration of the 
pilot project.
Public Benefits and Costs. Security benefits were cast almost completely in terms of 
avoiding attacks on trucks carrying high-consequence materials. The benefits are assumed 
to be the value of lives saved and property and economic savings ranging from $1.6 billion 
for a small event to $40.4 billion for a large one. The assumption was that if there is even a 
7% chance of a small attack being avoided for three years, the system pays for itself.
Industry Benefits and Costs.  For the high-consequence hazmat-industry fleets considered, 
installation costs varied considerably, depending on whether or not the carrier already had 
a tracking system in place; the installation costs for those that had systems were minimal, 
and the costs for those that did not have them would be significant. Installation time varied 
from one person working full time for three weeks to one person working full time for four 
weeks. The monthly operating cost was $136 per truck; however, the estimated monthly 
per-truck efficiency gain was $206. This created an efficiency-cost ratio of 1.5:1, enabling 
the system to pay for itself through increased efficiency within 18 months, although motor 
carriers with very small fleets are unlikely to realize this increased efficiency. However, 
mandating an increased communication frequency, from once every hour (the apparent 
industry standard) to, for example, the higher rate used by DTTS would significantly 
increase the operating cost. Experience with DTTS supports this observation. 
attack scenarios. It is not clear that TSA has stressed the system with difficult attack 
scenarios. The scenario described in the briefing was a simple hijacking attempt in which 
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the vehicle was taken and the driver was removed (safely) from the cab. The driver was 
then free to alert the system through use of a panic button. In the briefings, TSA did not 
treat scenarios that involved insiders or attackers with or without insider information who 
coerced drivers.
utilization of existing systems. The pilot system would allow current vehicle tracking 
systems to interface with the central system at a vendor cost of $15,000 to $20,000 for 
each interface, using XML protocol and standards approved by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). One of the pilot project’s three main components is a 
“universal communications interface” that works with existing systems. According to MTI’s 
review, this appears to be an accurate claim.
operation of the truck tracking center. How the TSA manages the TTC and how it 
would respond to an alert are important. Coordination between the TTC watch officer and 
TSA intelligence would be affected if an exception report was received; the TTC would 
then contact the company dispatch center to see if there might be an explanation for the 
exception report. If the exception could not be explained and was considered a high-
risk event, local law enforcement would be engaged. Each component would see the 
same core, common data needed, but proprietary and other sensitive information would 
be shown only to the company involved and government employees, respectively. If the 
hazmat shipment was confirmed to be high risk, a local and federal security response 
could be taken to halt and examine the vehicle in question or, presumably, other similar 
vehicles. 
TSA emphasized two features of TTC operations:  (1) a risk-based analysis that would 
include data from all sources—including data on the load and the position of the vehicle, 
intelligence information, etc.—to determine the risk level of the shipment, and (2) the ability 
to reach out quickly to the company and others to see if a reported high-risk exception could 
be explained, so that precious resources would not be wasted responding to false alarms. 
The TTC utilizes a “risk-based approach” to highlight high-risk events and minimize false 
alarms and considers verification of risk factors with carriers to be an important operational 
element in improving system capabilities. Like DTTS, TSA’s system involves verification of 
exception reports with carriers before an alarm is issued that activates state and local law 
enforcement and emergency responders.
geofencing and vehicle disabling. Although the pilot did not include vehicle 
immobilization technology (VIT), this is clearly a next step that is contemplated as an 
efficient way of stopping a coordinated “9/11 attack on the ground.”  It would combine the 
use of geofencing—which was being considered during Phase II of TSA’s pilot study—and 
VIT, which is not. Geofencing for high-consequence hazmat focuses on high-threat urban 
areas (HTUAs)—specifically, 48 such areas, including the national capitol region. Some 
of these were presumably involved in actual tests of geofencing. VIT will presumably be 
included in later phases, and it is to be hoped that the work on this technology performed 
by FMCSA (as well as any performed by DOD) will be incorporated.
system performance and other issues. While the pilot system tracked vehicles well, 
certain technical “glitches” need to be resolved, as well as some larger issues, including 
the following:
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System performance and improperly resolved alerts.•  Of the 39 (relatively simple) 
test events staged with six carriers, only 30 were properly identified and responded 
to. That represents a failure rate of around 25%. In addition, TSA indicated that 
response-time and system-security issues also needed to be resolved. 
Lack of manifest information.•  While DTTS requires an electronic upload of 
manifest information from the shipper, the TSA pilot system did not. Having 
details on the cargo being transported provided instantly to the TTC and other 
authorities is critical for risk analysis and timely response.
Difficulty in providing first responders.•  Two table-top exercises performed with 
simulated or live truck-tracking data illustrated that there are problems in providing 
first responders. First, insufficient first-responder “bandwidth” is available. Second, 
there is a need for “alignment with current procedures.”  Third, more manifest 
information is needed, along with improved methods for stopping a vehicle that 
has been verified as posing a high risk. This raises a concern about whether TSA 
will be able to give first responders the information priority they need over its own 
need to determine whether an entire fleet should be grounded. 
Lukewarm carrier reception. • Finally, the carriers’ reaction to TSA’s vehicle-tracking 
technologies has been lukewarm thus far. This probably explains why TSA has 
gone to great lengths to avoid any indication of mandatory implementation and 
why it is offering funds for motor carriers of high-risk hazmat to join in the pilot 
project.
The future progress of the TSA pilot project needs to be tracked. However, it is to understand 
that the project is specifically focused on high-consequence materials and that the targets 
to be protected are those that promise very high body counts. Many lessons can be learned 
by observing and perhaps participating in this program. Whether or not these are lessons 
that carriers have already learned by participation in DTTS remains to be seen. In any 
event, the implementation of VITs, particularly in combination with geofencing, needs to be 
encouraged and examined carefully.
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Outline of TSA Pilot Project
Phase I: Conceptual studies mandated in FY03–FY06 appropriations bills• 
Phase II:  Pilot study endorsed and funded in 9/11 bill for FY08–FY10• 
Participants: 10 carriers with 128 trucks, 7 vendors, 3 public safety centers• 
Focus  • 
     • High-consequence hazmat in high-threat situations
     • Mass casualties
     • Operation of TTC covering all states
     • Use of tracking systems and panic alerts (VIT not included)
Characterization  • 
     • Voluntary implementation as insurance against mandated government implementation
     • Use of existing systems through common protocols
     • Partial implementation has value (questionable)
Schedule and budget• 
     • March 30, 2008:  Draft technical report
     • May 15, 2008:  Final technical report
     • Next phase will last three years
     • $7 million for each year, of which $3 million is for equipment 
       (some will be used to equip participant fleets)
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key issues in implementing vehicle tracking 
Several key issues need to be considered before implementing a vehicle tracking system 
for gasoline tankers or, eventually, for other commodities and other vehicles. Most of these 
are not related to the technical details of communications and message formats, since most 
of the equipment and interfaces used are commercially available and relatively well tested. 
For example, satellite-based GPS systems are recommended in the federal pilot studies, 
a recommendation consistent with our finding of problems encountered with alternatives 
that rely on radio or cell-phone ground transmitters. (Thus far, ground-based systems have 
been used successfully only on small fleets of vehicles, such as those maintained by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in certain geographic areas.)  Although 
satellite coverage is limited in certain remote areas, this should not be an impediment if 
the target is large groups of people in crowded urban settings—for example, the satellite-
based On-Star response system is widely used in passenger cars.  Coverage limitations 
may diminish the system’s value as an anti-hijacking or anti-theft mechanism, however, 
so the capacity of urban satellite systems to accept additional hundreds or thousands 
of GPS transmitters would have to be studied to prevent failures due to overcrowding of 
the frequencies. Similarly, emergency response to system signals would overwhelm the 
capacity of a 911 call center designed as a local government resource.  
The driver panic button tested well in the FMSCA pilot, as did vehicle disabling. Work has 
since progressed, bringing to the fore even more “intelligent” and safer ways of remotely 
disabling vehicles (taking into account, for example, the speed of the vehicle and its vertical 
inclination when disabling is needed).
Finally, first opinions suggest that the IEEE, XLM, and web formats for data should make it 
relatively easy for organizations with systems and those without to interface well. 
A myriad of technical issues will have to be considered as a tracking system is designed, 
and any constraints they impose will have to be taken into account. However, these do not 
appear to be the major issues any state or other authority must consider.
The more important issues will relate to technical requirements, legal authority, operational 
control, and costs. Also, specific operational questions must be addressed to ensure that 
current emergency response capabilities are enhanced—and not diminished—by system 
implementation. 
The following general systems engineering issues will need to be addressed if and when a 
decision is made to implement a vehicle tracking system: 
  
Requirements and trade-offs of the system design.•  What is the hierarchy of 
requirements and where are the tradeoffs that most likely will have to be made? 
For example, will system designers have to prioritize the flow of information, 
deciding, for example, whether the need to find out where all other vehicles are 
is more important than the need to get information about an actual incident to 
emergency responders?     
Systems engineering and future growth.•   Does the system have the capacity to 
expand for future uses?  Can it be designed for expansion?  Is there a robust 
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systems engineering approach at the top level for the current and future iteration 
of vehicle tracking?
Federal versus state legal authority• . Federal preemption is more established in 
the transportation of hazardous materials than in most other areas. There will be 
even more preemption if the federal government implements a TSA-managed 
or -overseen vehicle tracking system for high-consequence materials. And while 
most of the gasoline tanker deliveries are intrastate, some cross state borders. 
To be effective, the system will have to apply to any vehicle operating in or 
coming into a state, which could mean banning the use of tankers not equipped 
for tracking at state borders unless the federal government was to mandate a 
requirement or other states were to join in the system. Obviously, this poses a 
major implementation barrier.
Operational issues.•  Among the questions that will have to be answered are:  (1) 
Who controls the information and who has authority to disable or shut down 
vehicles?  The driver, the company dispatch center, local police, a central control 
center, or all of them?  (2) If information to be conveyed is either law enforcement 
or security sensitive (which should be the case in the event of an attack), how 
does the right information get to the right people at the right time?  (3) If proprietary 
company information is involved, how can it be secured?   
Legal liability• . Legal liability will have to be defined for at least three circumstances: 
(1) an accident caused by an inadvertent or unnecessary activation of vehicle 
disabling; (2) an accident or an attack in which the system was not activated and 
could have been; and (3) an attack or accident in which the system was activated 
but did not work properly or did not prevent the accident. These are complex 
issues. 
Mandatory/voluntary implementation and cost-sharing.•   Whether the system is 
mandatory or not and how to shoulder its costs are key issues, and they are 
linked. Voluntary implementation, supported by financial incentives or state or 
local support, could secure the cooperation of large companies that have an 
inherent economic interest in the operational efficiencies and accident-reduction 
benefits a vehicle tracking system would bring.  However, the cost-benefit ratio 
may be different for many smaller motor carriers, and they may not be capable of 
or willing to make the investments. In addition, any implementing authority would 
have to consider whether a system designed to meet a perceived security need 
that does not incorporate all motor carriers is inherently flawed, since attackers 
could easily determine which company’s tankers are not equipped for tracking, 
thereby defeating the purpose of the system. 
Mandatory implementation would require one or some combination of the following methods 
to provide financial support:  (1) federal and/or state payments financed through general taxes; 
(2) license or other user fees or special taxes levied on some combination of manufacturers, 
entities, or consumers in the supply chain; or (3) the generation of production efficiencies 
that might follow a mandatory requirement set by a state. Needless to say, there is no easy 
solution that will appear equitable to all parties.
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Regardless of whether the system is voluntary or mandatory and how costs are covered, it 
is important that the full costs of the system be considered. These would include not only 
the costs of ground-based equipment, but also the cost of creating and staffing operational 
centers, future expansions and upgrades of equipment, and any retrofitting required. These 
need to be carefully estimated.
General System Development Issues
Requirements and tradeoffs: What are they, and which tradeoffs will have to be made?• 
Future growth: Is systems engineering capacity built in for future growth?• 
State and federal authority:  How can a system that requires 100% subscription work where • 
there are out-of-state tankers and the federal government can preempt the state?
Who will control the system and the flow of information?• 
Who is responsible if something goes wrong?• 
Will the system be mandatory or voluntary, and what is the best way to allocate full costs?• 
Specific Issues Pertaining to Emergency Response
It is clear that if a vehicle tracking system is needed, it cannot diminish—and indeed should 
enhance—the emergency response systems and resources used in gasoline tanker 
highway accidents involving an explosion and/or fire. And if the system is extended to 
other commodities, it should enhance other resources as well. Therefore, it is important to 
determine those characteristics of a tracking system that could increase response times 
and decrease the effectiveness of current emergency response capabilities and that must 
be avoided. The preliminary recommendations that follow indicate just how challenging a 
task this will be.
Although tankers are placarded and regulated and are limited to specific routes by 
local communities for traffic management purposes, there are state limitations on such 
restrictions, and in general, tankers are fairly ubiquitous. This is understandable given the 
need to supply gasoline for motor vehicles.  
Currently, the response to the discharge of petroleum materials resulting from traffic 
accidents, human error during delivery, or vandalism is based on the local fire department 
handling abatement and private contractors paid for by the truck’s owners handling clean-
up. For large spills, the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Technical 
Assistance Team (TAT) oversees the clean-up to ensure protection of the environment 
and complete elimination of all environmental hazards. Local governments have limited 
hazmat response capability, and only the largest cities have dedicated hazmat teams with 
specialist- or technician-level personnel. In fact, local-government public safety personnel 
in many states are likely stretched thin trying to answer the calls for service generated by 
the growing population. 
Therefore, either a state authority would have to respond to all calls, or a new state-based 
response team would have to be created. If a statewide service were created, its costs 
could be reduced by positioning the teams near the most critical population targets, which 
presumably comprise or are near the most heavily trafficked freeways and state highways. 
A state law limiting the use of state highways by gasoline tankers except for direct deliveries 
to gas stations and private gas tanks (police and fire facilities, trucking-company garages, 
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and similar non-retail outlets) might minimize the cost impacts. 
preliminary recommendations for a vehicle tracking system 
Without considering other system tradeoffs, the following recommendations focus on what 
an optimum vehicle tracking system should include to maintain or increase response time 
and effectiveness.
 
Recommendation 1:  Create System Use Protocols  
Prior to activation, states needs to develop protocols to: 
Distinguish between service calls generated by routine events and those • 
requiring a specialized team. For example, a routine traffic accident should still 
be handled by the responsible jurisdiction, but a driver distress call or waypoint 
signal alarm would be responded to by a specialized team  
Determine the scope of the system by considering commodities being • 
transported, vehicle routing, and proximity to critical targets. 
Base infrastructure decisions on a solid plan, and establish emergency-asset • 
response times accordingly. For example, flat roadbed in remote areas might 
require a relatively slow response time, while other stretches of roadway near 
refineries or other sensitive facilities, or through highly congested urban areas 
might require a 3- to 5-minute response time. Such a rapid response would 
require the prepositioning of special teams for high-risk commodities and 
locations and would depend on the capabilities of local first responders for 
lower-risk commodities and locations.
Review response plans to determine whether and how hazmat-transporting • 
vehicles have been factored into disaster planning. 
Work with administering agencies, regional emergency-planning organizations, • 
and local emergency-planning committees across the state to ensure that the 
vehicles, commodities, and attack scenarios identified as being of greatest 
concern are considered in all future regional transportation threat-analysis 
documents.
Recommendation 2:  Create System Integration Protocols  
It is necessary to agree on who responds to what. At the present time, state laws may 
provide for a response to hazardous-materials-related events by the closest police (on 
the public roads) or fire department (on private property) first responders. A new vehicle 
tracking system would require a statewide agreement among all first-responder agencies 
on how responses to different events would be handled. The local government would 
probably retain responsibility for routine traffic accidents and events involving petroleum 
tankers, while a new organization would probably be responsible for responding to events 
detected by the new surveillance system. To avoid duplicating expensive resources, such 
as fire department-based hazmat response teams or police department-based explosive-
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ordnance disposal units, the new system might establish a fee-for-service relationship 
between existing first responders and any state-based licensing system for specialized 
responses. 
Recommendation 3:  Train and Equip Chemical-Terrorism Response Teams
As noted earlier, a response capability has to be in place. Teams should focus, but not 
exclusively, on petroleum products, their derivatives, and the fires associated with their 
accidental or intentional discharge. Federal and state law also requires that personal 
protective equipment (PPE) be issued to such teams. Each type of PPE has its own testing, 
quality control, training, and medical surveillance requirements for each officer using it.
Recommendation 4:  Create Response Protocols
In the event of a terrorist threat or an actual attack that requires the vehicle tracking system 
to be implemented, particularly for vehicle disabling, the response plan must be harmonized 
with various state and federal systems, such as the Incident Command System (ICS), 
the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). Response protocols will have to be integrated into broader 
terrorism-response plans at the local, operational area, state, and federal levels. The 
questions that will need to be addressed include the following:
Managing distress-signal alarms. If a driver distress signal is received, what is the • 
responding law enforcement agency supposed to do? How are false alarms to be 
anticipated and managed?
Alarms without driver distress. If a vehicle alarm or exception report is received • 
but there is no driver distress signal, how should the event be examined?  When 
should it be treated as a possible hijacking?  When should chemical-response 
gear be donned?
Notification and sequence of response. Which agency responds first, and who • 
provides mutual aid?  In what order are first responders notified, and how can first 
responders be guaranteed to get all the information they need?  
Victims and potential victims. How and when are potential victims notified? What • 
are they instructed to do? Shelter in place, evacuate?  How are the choices made, 
based on what information?
Media interface. Who will handle the emergency media information system? • 
Which reporting authority will issue the alerts? Who is responsible for opening 
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/Joint Information Center (JIC)?
Controlling agency?  Who is the controlling authority? Is the incident a state event, • 
with the regional emergency operations center in the lead, or a local emergency, 
with the city or county emergency operations center in the lead?
This is just a sample of the key issues that need to be explored in considering the 
implementation of a vehicle tracking system.
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Preliminary Recommendations to Maintain and Enhance Emergency Response
Create system use protocols and define the scope of coverage in terms of fleets and infrastructure; • 
review and deconflict all existing emergency response and security plans.
Create system integration protocols, i.e., decide who responds to what and how.• 
Train and fully equip a chemical-terrorism response team.• 
Create response protocols to manage the entire range of issues, from false alarms, to • 
treatment of the injured, to fielding press inquiries, and for deciding which, and under what 
circumstances, is the controlling agency. 
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sources of additional information on 
vehicle tracking and disabling services
This section provides the names of vendors that participated in the FMCSA and TSA 
pilot projects or studies, as well as the only technology evaluation to date. One of these 
companies, QUALCOMM (apparently the largest firm in this field) also has provided vehicle 
tracking service for DOD’s DTTS. While we have reviewed the web-based literature of 
some of these vendors, we have not attempted to evaluate the range, price, or quality of 
services offered. Such an evaluation would require a market assessment and contacts with 
each vendor. However, the number, range, and services offered seem to be increasingly 
robust, and the number of vendors is apparently increasing, primarily in response to the 
drive toward efficiency, theft reduction, safety, and finally security-risk reduction.
FMCSA’s Field Operational Test
In FMCSA’s 2003–2004 Field Operations Test, the deployment team that tested the 
various technologies was led by Battelle and included QUALCOMM, the American 
Transportation Research Institute (ATRI), the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), 
Savi Technologies, the Biometrics Solutions Group (BSG), TotalSecurity-US, and the Spill 
Center. An evaluation was performed by Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC). During beta testing, QUALCOMM used a “technology truck” to validate the system 
design and operational concept of the test. The technologies of various vendors were used 
to test the following components:
Wireless-mobile communication, including wireless satellite or terrestrial 1. 
communication and tracking (with GPS), and digital phone (without GPS)
In-vehicle technologies, including on-board computers (OBC), panic buttons 2. 
that allow for localized vehicle disabling, and electronic seals
Personal identification through biometrics and personal identification numbers 3. 
(PINs) 
Mobile data management, including routing and geofencing software and trailer 4. 
tracking25 
Remote (“over the air”) vehicle disabling5. 
The field test was designed not to evaluate the quality of all vendors, but to evaluate specific 
functional requirements. Battelle chose QUALCOMM, Savi, Saflink, and the Spill Center 
to provide technologies for testing. The team also developed a compendium of COTS 
(commercially available off-the-shelf) technology available in the marketplace that might 
be applied to hazmat safety and security. This compendium included a review of articles 
and information provided by interested vendors who responded to news alerts that directed 
them to a website. The compendium includes contact information, product functionality 
and descriptions, and market penetration and pricing information for 88 companies that 
had products to offer.
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Products offered by the vendors include the following categories: 
Satellite tracking    •     Cellular phones or paging service• 
Terrestrial tracking   •     Automated collision notification• 
Trailer tracking    •     Untethered-trailer tracking• 
Keypad personnel authentication •     Trailer securement• 
Biometric authentication  •     Driver authentication• 
Asset management   •     Cargo securement• 
Mapping     •     Remote vehicle disabling• 
Inventory management   •     Web-based shipping tracking• 
Radio-frequency identification tag •     Out-of-route mapping system or alert• 
Electronic cargo seals   •     Mechanical cargo seals• 
In-vehicle mounted computer  •     In-vehicle communications• 
Integration software   •     Consultant services• 
Others • 
Another six companies that were not yet offering COTS products were identified but not 
included in the compendium.26   
The number of vendors gives some indication of the market interest, and while FMCSA has 
not updated this compendium, the FMCSA staff involved in the later vehicle immobilization 
technology (VIT) demonstration noted that certain technologies, such as vehicle 
immobilization and trailer tracking, had expanded considerably. DOD officials also indicated 
that trailer tracking was expanding. 
FMCSA’s UTT Demonstration 
To conduct the demonstration, SAIC and QUALCOMM conducted the test using 
QUALCOMM’s TrailerTRACS system. Other UTT systems mentioned in the report  because 
they had similar technologies include General Electric’s VeriWise, GeoLogic Solution’s 
TrailerMax, Terion’s Fleetview 3 Trailer Management System, Skybitz’s Global Location 
System, TransCore GlobalWave, Teletouch Communication’s Vision Trax, and AirlQ’s 
Refrigerated Trailer Tracking Solutions. Skybitz and Geologic also served on the expert 
panel and provided technical information throughout the pilot.27 
FMCSA’s Extended Satellite Coverage Demonstration
QUALCOMM’s wireless satellite-based mobile communications system (OmniTracks) and 
related host software (QTRACS) was tested, also using a QUALCOMM communications 
center. These QUALCOMM components provided two-way data communication between 
the driver and the carrier, with a driver interface unit for two-way text communication; free-
form, macro (formatted text messages), or binary messages (converted to binary form); 
position of the tractor and time and date of the transmitted message; tethered trailer tracking; 
and panic alerts.28 
FMCSA’s VIT Demonstration
The following vendors participated in FMCSA’s test of VITs by testing all of the functional 
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requirements and by bringing their equipment to the test ground: QUALCOMM and 
MAGTECH, Satellite Security Systems and Bluebird Bus Company, International Truck and 
Engine and NAVISTAR, BSM Wireless, and Glue Hugh Enterprises and Archetype. FMCSA 
staff also indicated that some of these vendors, including QUALCOMM and MAGTECH, 
are teaming to offer VIT technology in the marketplace, which is significant because of 
QUALCOMM’s large commercial presence29  in the wireless communications area.
TSA’s Truck Tracking Pilot
TSA’s current hazmat-truck-security pilot has been managed by a project team consisting 
of General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems (GD), Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC), Northrop Grumman (NG), and DOD’s DTTS TieBridge 
and Wu Consulting. The carriers that participated were CYNACO, Dupre, Honeywell, Martin 
CNG, Midwest X-Ray, Occidental Energy Transportation, Orica, R&R Trucking, Tri State, 
and VandeMark. The tracking vendor participants were Cadec, PeopleNet, QUALCOMM, 
SafeFrieght, Shaw Trucking, Transcore, and Volvo.30 
DOD’s DTTS
QUALCOMM provides the satellite truck tracking service for DTTS, and another vendor 
(ComTech Mobile) has also been selected. Three additional vendors have been selected 
to provide trailer tracking services beginning in April 2008.31 
In summary, there seem to be no major barriers to technical development and implementation 
if a state chooses to implement a tracking system that also includes geofencing and 
vehicle disabling, although all technologies—and the latter technology in particular—will 
require careful integration with public authorities, private companies, and their operational 
procedures, particularly in responding to an alert or exception report.
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abbreviations and acronyms
AA&E Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco And Firearms
ATRI American Transportation Research Institute
BSG Biometrics Solutions Group
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CDC Centers For Disease Control
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
DOT United States Department Of Transportation 
DTTS Defense Transportation Tracking System
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESCT Expanded Satellite-Based Mobile Communications Tracking
FAM Federal Air Marshal
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FOT Field Operation Test
FPCON Force Protection Conditions
FR Functional Requirement
FTA Federal Transit Administration
GD General Dynamics
GPS Global Positioning System
GAO Government Accountability Office
Hazmat Hazardous Materials
HHSM Highway Security-Sensitive Hazardous Materials
HTUA High Threat Urban Area
ICS Incident Command System
IEEE Institute of Electrical And Elecronic Engineers
JIC Joint Information Center
LEO Law Enforcement Officer
LTL Less-Than-Truckload
MTI Mineta Transportation Institute
MTMC Military Traffic Management Command
NG Northrup Grumman
NIMS National Incident Management System
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NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTSCOE National Transportation Security Center Of Excellence
OBC On-Board Computers
PIH Poison Inhalation Hazard
PIN Personal Identification Number
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PMO Project Management Office
PRSC Public Sector Reporting Enter Concept
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration
SAIC Science Applications International Corporations
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SEMS Standardized Emergency Management System
SEV Security Escort Vehicle
SSI Sensitive Security Information
TAT Technical Assistance Taem
TIH Toxic Inhalation Hazard
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TTC Truck Tracking Center
UTT Untethered Trailer Tracking
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VIT Vehicle Immobilization Technology
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be published in Supply Chain Security: International Innovations and Practices for Moving 
Goods Safely and Efficiently by Praeger. In 2009 she delivered papers at the Department of 
Homeland Security Center of Excellence conference on MTI’s research agenda, and at the 
American Society for Public Administration on “Legacy of Hurricane Katrina: The Challenges 
of International Goodwill.” In 2008 she delivered papers at the American Society for Public 
Administration on the financial impacts of Hurricane Katrina, and at the Stevenson Disaster 
Institute at Louisiana State University on cross border issues in disaster response. Her 
paper was published in 2009 in the Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management. In 
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Democracy and Global Security where she delivered a paper titled “Police in Catastrophic 
Response: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina.” She also presented a paper at 
the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) on “Collaborative Leadership in 
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Stanford University, in American Journal of Disaster Medicine, March/April 2008.
Previously, Dr. Edwards was director of the Office of Emergency Services in San José, 
California for 14 years, including one year as acting assistant chief for the City of San 
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on Chemical and Biological Warfare, the Department of Justice’s Executive Session on 
Domestic Preparedness at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the 
National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine MMRS Review Committee, and the 
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homeland security; NATO and Terrorism: Catastrophic Terrorism and First Responders 
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Emergency Management, Homeland Security Law and Policy, First to Arrive, Handbook 
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conferences. 
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San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of 
Trustees have agreed upon a peer review process required for all research published by 
MTI. The purpose of the review process is to ensure that the results presented are based 
upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects beginning with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, 
with in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the Research Associated Policy 
Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the 
Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other 
professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the 
research methodology.  
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The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies (MTI) was established by Congress as part 
of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U.S. Department 
of Transportation through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Con-
gress through the United States Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration, the Califor-
nia Legislature through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community. 
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas 
include: transportation security; planning and policy develop-
ment; interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and professional 
references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, the 
MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-level 
education to students seeking a career in the development and 
operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through San 
José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of Sci-
ence in Transportation Management and a graduate Certificate 
in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the nation’s 
transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s de-
gree is the highest conferred by the California State University 
system. With the active assistance of the California Department 
of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-
the-art videoconference network throughout the state 
of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing working 
transportation professionals to pursue an advanced degree 
regardless of their location. To meet the needs of employ-
ers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education program 
promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results to 
transportation professionals and encourages Research As-
sociates to present their findings at conferences. The World 
in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers innovation 
in the Institute’s research and education programs. MTI’s 
extensive collection of transportation-related publications 
is integrated into San José State University’s world-class 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented here-
in. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers Program 
and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily reflect the official 
views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability for the contents or 
use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation. The views and conclusions contained in this 
document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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